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Abstract. We put forward a new family of computational assumptions,
the Kernel Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Given some matrix A
sampled from some distribution D, the kernel assumption says that it
is hard to find “in the exponent” a nonzero vector in the kernel of A>.
This family is a natural computational analogue of the Matrix Decisional
Diffie-Hellman Assumption (MDDH), proposed by Escala et al. As such
it allows to extend the advantages of their algebraic framework to com-
putational assumptions.
The k-Decisional Linear Assumption is an example of a family of de-
cisional assumptions of strictly increasing hardness when k grows. We
show that for any such family of MDDH assumptions, the corresponding
Kernel assumptions are also strictly increasingly weaker. This requires
ruling out the existence of some black-box reductions between flexible
problems (i.e., computational problems with a non unique solution).
Keywords: Matrix Assumptions, Computational Problems, Black-Box Reduc-
tions, Structure Preserving Cryptography
1 Introduction
It is commonly understood that cryptographic assumptions play a crucial role
in the development of secure, efficient protocols with strong functionalities. For
instance, upon referring to the rapid development of pairing-based cryptography,
X. Boyen [8] says that “it has been supported, in no small part, by a dizzying
array of tailor-made cryptographic assumptions”. Although this may be a rea-
sonable price to pay for constructing new primitives or improve their efficiency,
one should not lose sight of the ideal of using standard and simple assumptions.
This is an important aspect of provable security. Indeed, Goldreich [16], for in-
stance, cites “having clear definitions of one’s assumptions” as one of the three
main ingredients of good cryptographic practice.
There are many aspects to this goal. Not only it is important to use clearly
defined assumptions, but also to understand the relations between them: to
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see, for example, if two assumptions are equivalent or one is weaker than the
other. Additionally, the definitions should allow to make accurate security claims.
For instance, although technically it is correct to say that unforgeability of the
Waters’ signature scheme [42] is implied by the DDH Assumption, defining the
CDH Assumption allows to make a much more precise security claim.
A notable effort in reducing the “dizzying array” of cryptographic assump-
tions is the work of Escala et al. [11]. They put forward a new family of decisional
assumptions in a prime order group G, the Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption
(D`,k-MDDH). It says that, given some matrix A ∈ Z`×kq sampled from some
distribution D`,k, it is hard to decide membership in Im A, the subspace spanned
by the columns of A, in the exponent. Rather than as new assumption, it should
be seen as an algebraic framework for decisional assumptions which includes as
a special case the widely used k-Lin family.
This framework has some obvious conceptual advantages. For instance, it
allows to explain all the members of the k-Lin assumption family (and also oth-
ers, like the uniform assumption, appeared previously in [13, 14, 41]) as a single
assumption and unify different constructions of the same primitive in the lit-
erature (e.g., the Naor-Reingold PRF [36] and the Lewko-Waters PRF [29] are
special cases of the same construction instantiated with the 1-Lin and the 2-Lin
Assumption, respectively). Another of its advantages is that it avoids arbitrary
choices and instead points out to a trade-off between efficiency and security (a
scheme based on any D`,k-MDDH Assumption can be instantiated with many
different assumptions, some leading to stronger security guarantees and others
leading to more efficient schemes). But follow-up work has also illustrated other
possibly less obvious advantages. For instance, Herold et al. [21] have used the
Matrix Diffie-Hellman abstraction to extend the model of composite-order to
prime-order transformation of Freeman [13] and to derive efficiency improve-
ments which were proven to be impossible in the original model.3 We believe
this illustrates that the benefits of conceptual clarity can translate into concrete
improvements as well.
The security notions for cryptographic protocols can be classified mainly
in hiding and unforgeability ones. The former typically appear in encryption
schemes and commitments and the latter in signature schemes and soundness
in zero-knowledge proofs. Although it is theoretically possible to base the hid-
ing property on computational problems, most of the practical schemes achieve
this notion either information theoretically or based on decisional assumptions,
at least in the standard model. Likewise, unforgeability naturally comes from
computational assumptions (typically implied by stronger, decisional assump-
tions). Thus, a natural question is if one can find a computational analogue of
their MDDH Assumption which can be used in “unforgeability type” of security
notions.
3 More specifically, we are referring to the lower bounds on the image size of a pro-
jecting bilinear map of [39] which were obtained in Freeman model [13]. The results
of [21] by-passed this lower bounds allowing to save on pairing operations for pro-
jecting maps in prime order groups.
Most computational problems considered in the literature are search prob-
lems with a unique solution like the discrete logarithm or CDH. But unforge-
ability actually means the inability to produce one among many solutions to
a given problem (e.g., in many signature schemes or zero knowledge proofs).
Thus, unforgeability is more naturally captured by a flexible computational prob-
lem, namely, a problem which admits several solutions4. This maybe explains
why several new flexible assumptions have appeared recently when considering
“unforgeability-type” security notions in structure-preserving cryptography [2].
Thus a useful computational analogue of the MDDH Assumption should not only
consider problems with a unique solution but also flexible problems which can
naturally capture this type of security notions.
1.1 Our Results
In the following G = (G, q,P), being G some group in additive notation of prime
order q generated by P, that is, the elements of G are Q = aP where a ∈ Zq.
They will be denoted as [a] := aP. This notation naturally extends to vectors
and matrices as [v] = (v1P, . . . , vnP) and [A] = (AijP).
Computational Matrix Assumptions. In our first attempt to design a com-
putational analogue of the MDDH Assumption, we introduce the Matrix Com-
putational DH Assumption, (MCDH) which says that, given a uniform vector
[v] ∈ Gk and some matrix [A], A ← D`,k for ` > k, it is hard to extend [v] to
a vector in G` in the image of [A], Im[A]. Although this assumption is natural
and is weaker than the MDDH one, we argue that it is equivalent to CDH.
We then propose the Kernel Matrix DH Assumption (D`,k-KerMDH). This
new flexible assumption states that, given some matrix [A], A← D`,k for some
` > k, it is hard to find a vector [v] ∈ G` in the kernel of A>. We observe
that for some special instances of D`,k, this assumption has appeared in the
literature in [2, 18, 19, 27, 32] under different names, like Simultaneous Pairing,
Simultaneous Double Pairing (SDP in the following), Simultaneous Triple Pair-
ing, 1-Flexible CDH, 1-Flexible Square CDH. Thus, the new KerMDH Assump-
tion allows us to organize and give a unified view on several useful assumptions.
This suggests that the KerMDH Assumption (and not the MCDH one) is the right
computational analogue of the MDDH framework. Indeed, for any matrix dis-
tribution the D`,k-MDDH Assumption implies the corresponding D`,k-KerMDH
Assumption. As a unifying algebraic framework, it offers the advantages men-
tioned above: it highlights the algebraic structure of any construction based on
it, and it allows writing many instantiations of a given scheme in a compact way.
The power of Kernel Assumptions. At Eurocrypt 2015, our KerMDH As-
sumptions were applied to design simpler QA-NIZK proofs of membership in
4 In the cryptographic literature we sometimes find the term “strong” as an alternative
to “flexible”, like the Strong RSA or the Strong DDH.
linear spaces [26]. They have also been used to give more efficient constructions
of structure preserving signatures [25], to generalize and simplify the results on
quasi-adaptive aggregation of Groth-Sahai proofs [17] (given originally in [24])
and to construct a tightly secure QA-NIZK argument for linear subspaces with
unbounded simulation soundness in [15]. The power of a KerMDH Assumption is
that it allows to guarantee uniqueness. This has been used by Kiltz and Wee [26],
for instance, to compile some secret key primitives to the public key setting. In-
deed, Kiltz and Wee [26] modify a hash proof system (which is only designated
verifier) to allow public verification (a QA-NIZK proof of membership). In a
hash proof system for membership in some linear subspace of Gn spanned by
the columns of some matrix [M], the public information is [M>K], for some




The core argument to compile this to a public key primitive is that given
([A], [KA]), A ← D`,k and any pair [y], [pi], the previous test is equivalent to
e([pi>], [A]) = e([y>], [KA]), under the D`,k-KerMDH Assumption. Indeed,
e([pi>], [A]) = e([y>], [KA])⇐⇒ e([pi> − y>K], [A]) = [0] D`,k-KerMDH=⇒
=⇒ [pi] = [y>K]. (1)
That is, although potentially there are many possible proofs which satisfy the
public verification equation (left hand side of Equation (1)), the D`,k-KerMDH
Assumption guarantees that only one of them is efficiently computable, so veri-
fication gives the same guarantees as in the private key setting (right hand side
of Equation (1)). This property is also used in a very similar way in [15] and also
in the context of structure preserving signatures in [25]. In Section 5 we use it to
argue that, of all the possible openings of a commitment, only one is efficiently
computable, i.e. to prove computational soundness of a commitment scheme.
Moreover, some previous works, notably in the design of structure preserving
cryptographic primitives [1–3, 31], implicitly used this property for one specific
KerMDH Assumption: the Simultaneous (Double) Pairing Assumption.
On the other hand, we have already discussed the importance of having a
precise and clear language when talking about cryptographic assumptions. This
justifies the introduction of a framework specific to computational assumptions,
because one should properly refer to the assumption on which security is actually
based, rather than just saying “security is based on an assumption weaker than
D`,k-MDDH”. A part from being imprecise, a problem with such a statement
is that might lead to arbitrary, not optimal choices. For example, the signature
scheme of [30] is based on the SDP Assumption but a slight modification of it
can be based on the L2-KerMDH Assumption. If the security guarantee is “the
assumption is weaker than 2-Lin” then the modified scheme achieves shorter pub-
lic key and more efficient verification with no loss in security. Further, the claim
that security is based on the MDDH decisional assumptions when only compu-
tational ones are necessary might give the impression that a certain tradeoff is
in place when this is not known to be the case. For instance, Jutla and Roy [24]
construct constant-size QA-NIZK arguments of membership in linear spaces un-
der what they call the “Switching Lemma”, which is proven under a certain
Dk+1,k-MDDH Assumption. However, a close look at the proof reveals that in
fact it is based on the corresponding Dk+1,k-KerMDH Assumption5. For these
assumptions, prior to our work, it was unclear whether the choice of larger k
gives any additional guarantees.
Strictly Increasing Families of Kernel Assumptions. An important prob-
lem is that it is not clear whether there are increasingly weaker families of
KerMDH Assumptions. That is, some decisional assumptions families param-
eterized by k like the k-Lin Assumption are known to be strictly increasingly
weaker. The proof of increasing hardness is more or less immediate and the term
strictly follows from the fact that every two D`,k-MDDH and D˜`,k˜-MDDH prob-
lems with k˜ < k are separated by an oracle computing a k-linear map. For the
computational case, increasing hardness is also not too difficult, but nothing is
known about strictly increasing hardness (see Fig. 1). This means that, as op-
posed to the decisional case, prior to our work, for protocols based on KerMDH
Assumptions there was no-known tradeoff between larger k (less efficiency) and
security.
In this paper, we prove that the families of matrix distributions in [11], U`,k,
Lk, SCk, Ck and RLk, as well as a new distribution we propose in Section 6,
the circulant family CIk,d, define families of kernel problems with increasing
hardness. For this we show a tight reduction from the smaller to the larger
problems in each family. Our main result (Theorem 2) is to prove that the
hardness of these problems is strictly increasing. For this, we prove that there is
no black-box reduction from the larger to the smaller problems in the multilinear
generic group model. These new results correspond to the dotted arrows in Fig. 1.
D1-MDDH D2-MDDH D3-MDDH D4-MDDH · · ·
D1-KerMDH D2-KerMDH D3-KerMDH D4-KerMDH · · ·
/ / /
/ / /
Fig. 1. Implication and separation results between Matrix Assumptions (dotted arrows
correspond to the new results).
Having in mind that the computational problems we study in the paper are
defined in a generic way, that is without specifying any particular group, the
5 To see this, note that in the proof of their “Switching Lemma” on which soundness
is based, they use the output of the adversary to decide if f
?∈ ImA, A←RLk, by
checking whether [f ] is orthogonal to the adversary’s output (equation (1), proof of
Lemma 1, [24], full version), and where RLk is the matrix distribution of Section 2.3.
generic group approach arises naturally as the setting for the analysis of their
hardness and reducibility relations. Otherwise, we would have to rely on specific
properties of the representation of the elements of particular group families, not
captured by the generic model.
The proof of Theorem 2 requires dealing with the notion of black-box reduc-
tion between flexible problems. A black-box reduction must work for any possible
behavior of the oracle, but, contrary to the normal (unique answer) black-box
reductions, here the oracle has to choose among the set of valid answers in ev-
ery call. Ruling out the existence of a reduction implies that for any reduction
there is an oracle behavior for which the reduction fails. This is specially subtle
when dealing with multiple oracle calls. We think that the proof technique we
introduce to deal with these issues can be considered as a contribution in itself
and can potentially be used in future work.
Combining the black-box techniques and the generic group model is not new
in the literature. For instance Dodis et al. [10] combine the black-box reductions
and a generic model for the group Z∗n to show some uninstantiability results for
FDH-RSA signatures.
Theorem 2 supports the intuition that there is a tradeoff between the size
of the matrix — which typically results in less efficiency — and the hardness
of the KerMDH Problems, and justifies the generalization of several protocols to
different choices of k given in [17, 24–26].
Applications. The discussion of our results given so far should already highlight
some of the advantages of using the new Kernel family of assumptions and the
power of these new assumptions, which have already been used in compelling
applications in follow-up work in [17, 25, 26]. To further illustrate the usefulness
of the new framework, we apply it to the study of trapdoor commitments. First,
we revisit the Pedersen commitment [38] to vectors of scalars and its extension
to vectors of group elements of Abe et al. [2] in bilinear groups. We unify these
two constructions and we generalize to commit vectors of elements at each level
Gr, for any 0 ≤ r ≤ m under the extension of KerMDH Assumptions to the
ideal m-graded encodings setting. In particular, when m = 2 we recover in a
single construction as a special case both the original Pedersen and Abe et al.
commitments.
The (generalized) Pedersen commitment maps vectors in Gr to vectors in
Gr+1, is perfectly hiding and computationally binding under any Kernel As-
sumption. In Section 5.2 we use it as a building block to construct a “group-to-
group” commitment, which maps vectors inGr to vectors in the same group Gr.
These commitments were defined in [3] because they are a good match to Groth-
Sahai proofs. In [3], two constructions were given, one in asymmetric and the
other in symmetric bilinear groups. Both are optimal in terms of commitment
size and number of verification equations. Rather surprisingly, we show that both
constructions in [3] are special instances of our group-to-group commitment for
some specific matrix distributions.
A New Family of MDDH Assumptions of Optimal Representation Size.
We also propose a new interesting family of Matrix distributions, the circulant
matrix distribution, CIk,d, which defines new MDDH and KerMDH assumptions.
This family generalizes the Symmetric Cascade Distribution (SCk) defined in [11]
to matrices of size `×k, ` = k+d > k+1. We prove that it has optimal representa-
tion size d independent of k among all matrix distributions of the same size. The
case ` > k + 1 typically arises when one considers commitments/encryption in
which the message is a vector of group elements instead of a single group element
and the representation size typically affects the size of the public parameters.
We prove the hardness of the CIk,d-KerMDH Problem, by proving that the
CIk,d-MDDH Problem is generically hard in k-linear groups. Analyzing the hard-
ness of a family of decisional problems (depending on a parameter k) can be
rather involved, specially when an efficient k-linear map is supposed to exist.
This is why in [11], the authors gave a practical criterion for generic hardness
when ` = k + 1 in terms of irreducibility of some polynomials involved in the
description of the problem. This criterion was used then to prove the generic
hardness of several families of MDDH Problems. To analyze the generic hardness
of the CIk,d-MDDH Problem for any d, the techniques in [11] are not practical
enough, and we need some extensions of these techniques for the case ` > k+ 1,
recently introduced in [20]. However, we could not avoid the explicit computation
of a large (but well-structured) Gro¨bner basis of an ideal associated to the matrix
distribution. The new assumption can be used to instantiate the commitment
schemes of Section 5 with shorter public parameters and improved efficiency.
2 Preliminaries
For λ ∈ N, we write 1λ for the string of λ ones. For a set S, s← S denotes the
process of sampling an element s from S uniformly at random. For an algorithm
A, we write z ← A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is a (probabilistic) algorithm
that outputs z on input (x, y, . . .). For any two computational problems P1 and
P2 we recall that P1 ⇒ P2 denotes the fact that P1 reduces to P2, and then ‘P1
is hard’ ⇒ ‘P2 is hard’. Thus, we will use ‘⇒’ both for computational problems
and for the corresponding hardness assumptions.
Let Gen denote a cyclic group instance generator, that is a probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that on input 1λ returns a description G =
(G, q,P) of a cyclic group G of order q for a λ-bit prime q and a generator P of
G. We use additive notation for G and its elements are aP, for a ∈ Zq and will
be denoted as [a] := aP. The notation extends to vectors and matrices in the
natural way as [v] = (v1P, . . . , vnP) and [A] = (AijP). For a matrix A ∈ Z`×kq ,
Im A denotes the subspace of Z`q spanned by the columns of A. Thus, Im[A] is
the corresponding subspace of G`.
2.1 Multilinear Maps
In the case of groups with a bilinear map, or more generally with a k-linear map
for k ≥ 2, we consider a generator producing the tuple (ek,G1,Gk, q,P1,Pk),
where G1,Gk are cyclic groups of prime-order q, Pi is a generator of Gi and ek
is a non-degenerate efficiently computable k-linear map ek : G
k
1 → Gk, such that
ek(P1, . . . ,P1) = Pk. We actually consider graded encodings which offer a richer
structure. For any fixed k ≥ 1, let MGenk be a PPT algorithm that on input 1λ
returns a description of a graded encodingMGk = (e,G1, . . . ,Gk, q,P1, . . . ,Pk),
where G1, . . . ,Gk are cyclic groups of prime-order q, Pi is a generator of Gi
and e is a collection of non-degenerate efficiently computable bilinear maps ei,j :
Gi×Gj → Gi+j , for i+j ≤ k, such that e(Pi,Pj) = Pi+j . For simplicity we will
omit the subindexes of e when they become clear from the context. Sometimes
G0 is used to refer to Zq. For group elements we use the following implicit
notation: for all i = 1, . . . , k, [a]i := aPi. The notation extends in a natural way
to vectors and matrices and to linear algebra operations. We sometimes drop
the index when referring to elements in G1, i.e., [a] := [a]1 = aP1. In particular,
it holds that e([a]i, [b]j) = [ab]i+j .
Additionally, for the asymmetric case, let AGen2 be a PPT algorithm that
on input 1λ returns a description of an asymmetric bilinear group AG2 =
(e,G,H,T, q,P,Q), where G,H,T are cyclic groups of prime-order q, P is a
generator of G, Q is a generator of H and e : G×H→ T is a non-degenerate,
efficiently computable bilinear map. In this case we refer to group elements as:
[a]G := aP, [a]H := aQ and [a]T := ae(P,Q).
2.2 A Generic Model For Groups With Graded Encodings
In this section we describe a (purely algebraic) generic model for the graded
encodings functionality, in order to obtain meaningful results about the hard-
ness and separations of computational problems. The model is an adaptation
of Maurer’s generic group model [33, 34] including the k-graded encodings, but
in a completely algebraic formulation that follows the ideas in [5, 12, 20]. Since
the k-graded encodings functionality implies the k-linear group functionality,
the former gives more power to the adversaries or reductions working within the
corresponding generic model. This in particular means that non-existential re-
sults proven in the richer k-graded encodings generic model also imply the same
results in the k-linear group generic model. Therefore, in this paper we consider
the former model. Due to the space limitations, we can only give a very succinct
description of the model. See the full version of the paper [35] for a detailed and
more formal description.
In a first approach we consider Maurer’s model adapted to the graded encod-
ings functionality, but still not phrased in a purely algebraic language. In this
model, an algorithm A does not deal with proper group elements in [y]a ∈ Ga,
but only with labels (Y, a), and it has access to an additional oracle internally
performing the group operations, so that A cannot benefit from the particular
way the group elements are represented. Namely, on start all the group ele-
ments [x1]a1 , ..., [xα]aα in the input intended for A are replaced by the labels
(X1, a1), . . . , (Xα, aα). Then, A actually receives as input the set of labels, and
possibly some other non-group elements (i.e., that do not belong to any of the
groups G1, . . . ,Gk), denoted as x˜, and considered as a bit string. For each group
Ga two additional labels (0, a), (1, a), corresponding to the neutral element and
the generator, are implicitly given to A. Then A can adaptively make the fol-
lowing queries to an oracle implementing the k-graded encodings:
– GroupOp((Y1, a), (Y2, a)): group operation in Ga for two previously issued
labels in Ga resulting in a new label (Y3, a) in Ga.
– GroupInv((Y, a)): similarly for group inversion in Ga.
– GroupPair((Y1, a), (Y2, b)): bilinear map for two previously issued labels in
Ga and Gb, a+ b ≤ k, resulting in a new label (Y3, a+ b) in Ga+b.
– GroupEqTest((Y1, a), (Y2, a)): test two previously issued labels inGa for equal-
ity of the corresponding group elements, resulting in a bit (1 = equality).
In addition, the oracle performs the actual computations with the group ele-
ments, and it uses them to answer the GroupEqTest queries. Every badly formed
query (for instance, containing a label not previously issued by the oracle or as
an input to A) is answered with a special rejection symbol ⊥. Following the usual
step in generic group model proofs (see for instance [5, 11, 20]), we use polynomi-
als as labels to group elements. Namely, labels in Ga are polynomials in Zq[X],
where the algebraic variables X = (X1, . . . , Xα) are just formal representations
of the group elements in the input of A. Now the oracle computes the new labels
using the natural polynomial operations: GroupOp((Y1, a), (Y2, a)) = (Y1+Y2, a),
GroupInv((Y, a)) = (−Y, a) and GroupPair((Y1, a), (Y2, b)) = (Y1Y2, a + b). It is
easy to see that for any valid label (Y, a), deg Y ≤ a.6
The output of A consists only of some labels (Y1, b1), . . . , (Yβ , bβ) (given
at some time by the oracle) corresponding to group elements [y1]b1 , ..., [yβ ]bβ ,
along with some non-group elements, denoted as y˜. Therefore, for any fixed
random tape of A and any choice of the non-group elements x˜, there exist
polynomials Y1, . . . , Yβ ∈ Zq[X] of degrees upper bounded by b1, . . . , bβ re-
spectively, with coefficients known to A. Notice that A itself can predict all
answers given by the oracle except for some GroupEqTest queries. In particular,
some GroupEqTest queries trivially result in 1, due to the group structure (e.g.,
GroupOp((Y, a),GroupInv((Y, a))) is the same as (0, a)), or due to the (known) a
priori constraints in the input group elements (i.e., the definition of the problem
instance given to A). The answers to nontrivial GroupEqTest queries (i.e., queries
that cannot be trivially predicted by A) are the only effective information A can
receive from the generic group oracle.
We now introduce a “purely algebraic” version of the generic model. For that,
we need to assume that the distribution of x can be sampled by evaluating a
polynomial map f of constant degree at a random point.7 This is not an actual
restriction in our context since all Matrix Diffie-Hellman problems fulfil this
requirement. In the “purely algebraic” model we redefine the oracle GroupEqTest
to answer 1 if and only if A can itself predict the positive answer. Namely
GroupEqTest((Y1, a), (Y2, a)) = 1 if and only if Y1 ◦ f = Y2 ◦ f as polynomials
6 It clearly holds for the input group elements (since deg Y = 1), and the inequality
is preserved by GroupOp, GroupInv and GroupPair.
7 A formal definition of this notion is given in the full version of the paper.
over Zq. With this change the behavior of A can only differ negligibly from the
original,8 meaning that generic algorithms perform almost equally in Maurer’s
model and its purely algebraic version. But now, any generic algorithm is just
modelled by a set of polynomials. As we need to handle elements in different
groups, we will use the shorter vector notation [x]a = ([x1]a1 , . . . , [xα]aα) =
(x1Pa1 , . . . , xαPaα) ∈ Ga1 × · · · × Gaα . Note that the length of a vector of
indices a is denoted by a corresponding Greek letter α. We will also use a tilde
to denote variables containing only non-group elements (i.e., elements not in any
of G1, . . . ,Gk).
Lemma 1. Let A be an algorithm in the (purely algebraic) generic multilinear
group model. Let ([x]a, x˜) and ([y]b, y˜) respectively be the input and output of A.
Then, for every choice of x˜ and any choice of the random tape of A, there exist
polynomials Y1, . . . , Yβ ∈ Zq[X] of degree upper bounded by b1, . . . , bβ such that
y = Y (x), for all possible x ∈ Znq , where Y = (Y1, . . . , Yβ). Moreover, y˜ does
not depend on x.
The proof of the lemma comes from the above discussion.
As usually, the proposed generic model reduces the analysis of the hardness
of some problems to solving a merely algebraic problem related to polynomials.
As an example, consider a computational problem P which instances are entirely
described by some group elements in the base group G1, [x] ← P.InstGen(1λ),
and its solutions are also described by some group elements [y]b ∈ P.Sol([x]). We
also assume that P.InstGen just samples x by evaluating polynomial functions
of constant degree at a random point. Then, P is hard in the purely algebraic
generic multilinear group model if and only if for all (randomized) polynomials
Y1, . . . , Yβ ∈ Zq[X] of degrees upper bounded by b1, . . . , bβ respectively,
Pr([y]b ∈ P.Sol([x]) : [x]← P.InstGen(1λ), y = Y (x)) ∈ negl(λ)
where Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym) and the probability is computed with respect the ran-
dom coins of the instance generator and the randomized polynomials.9 In a few
words, this means that the set P.Sol([x]) cannot be hit by polynomials of the
given degree evaluated at x.
This model extends naturally to algorithms with oracle access (e.g., black-
box reductions) but only when the oracles fit well into the generic model. Let us
consider the algorithmAO, with oracle access toO. A completely arbitrary oracle
(specified in the plain model) could have access to the internal representation of
the group elements, and then it could leak some information about the group
8 As a standard argument used in proofs in the generic group model, the difference
between the original model and its purely algebraic reformulation amounts to a
negligible probability, which is typically upper-bounded by using Schwartz-Zippel
Lemma and the union bound, as shown for instance in [5, 12, 20].
9 We can similarly deal with problems with non-group elements both in the instance
description and the solution, but this would require a more sophisticated formal-
ization, in which both the polynomials and the non-group elements in the solution
could depend on the non-group elements in the instance, but in an efficient way.
elements that is outside the generic group model. Thus, we will impose the very
limiting constraint that the oracles are also “algebraic”, meaning that the oracle’s
input/output behavior respects the one-wayness of the graded encodings, and it
only performs polynomial operations on the input labels.
Definition 1. Let ([u]d, u˜) and ([v]e, v˜) respectively be a query to an oracle O
and its corresponding answer, where u˜ and v˜ contain the respective non-group
elements. The oracle O is called algebraic if for any choice of u˜ there exist
polynomials V1, . . . , V ∈ Zq[U ,R], R = (R1, . . . , Rρ), of constant degree (in the
security parameter) such that
– for the specific choice of u˜, vi = Vi(u, r), i = 1, . . . , , for all u ∈ Zq and
r ∈ Zρq , where r = (r1, . . . , rρ) are random parameters defined and uniformly
sampled by the oracle,
– v˜ does not depend on u, r (thus, r can only have influence in the group
elements in the answer),
– Vj does not depend on any Ui such that ej < di (in order to preserve the
one-wayness of the graded encodings),
The parameters r capture the behavior of an oracle solving a problem with
many solutions (called here a “flexible” problem). They could be independent or
not across different oracle calls, depending on whether the oracle is stateless or
stateful. For technical reasons we consider only the stateless case with uniform
sampling. Observe that the first two requirements in the definition mean that v
depends algebraically on u, r and no extra information about u, r can be leaked
through v˜. Removing any of these requirements from the definition results in
that a generic algorithm using such an oracle will no longer be algebraically
generic. Also notice that after a call to an algebraic oracle, there is no guarantee
that labels (Y, a) fulfil the bound deg Y ≤ a.
Although the notion of algebraic oracle looks very limiting (e.g., it excludes a
Discrete Logarithm oracle, as it destroys the one-wayness property of the graded
encodings, but oracles solving CDH or the Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman
problem fit well in the definition), it is general enough for our purposes. We will
need the following generalization of Lemma 1:
Lemma 2. Let AO be an oracle algorithm in the (purely algebraic) generic mul-
tilinear group model, making a constant number of calls Q to an algebraic oracle
O. Let ([x]a, x˜) and ([y]b, y˜) respectively be the input and output of A. Then, for
every choice of x˜ and the random tape, there exist polynomials of constant degree
Y1, . . . , Yβ ∈ Zq[X,R1, . . . ,RQ], such that y = Y (x, r1, . . . , rQ), for all possible
inputs, where Y = (Y1, . . . , Yβ), and r1, . . . , rQ are the parameters introduced in
Definition 1 for the Q queries. Moreover, y˜ does not depend on x or r1, . . . , rQ.
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A.
2.3 The Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
We recall here the definition of the decisional assumptions introduced in [11],
which are the starting point of our flexible computational matrix problems.
Definition 2. [11], Let `, k ∈ N with ` > k. We call D`,k a matrix distribution
if it outputs (in polynomial time, with overwhelming probability) matrices in
Z`×kq of full rank k. We denote Dk := Dk+1,k.
Definition 3 (D`,k-MDDH Assumption). [11] Let D`,k be a matrix distri-
bution. The D`,k-Matrix Diffie-Hellman (D`,k-MDDH) Problem is telling apart
the two probability distributions (G, q,P, [A], [Aw]) and (G, q,P, [A], [z]), where
A← D`,k,w ← Zkq , z ← Z`q.
We say that the D`,k-Matrix Diffie-Hellman (D`,k-MDDH) Assumption holds
relative to Gen if the corresponding problem is hard, that is, if for all PPT ad-
versaries A, the advantage
AdvD`,k,Gen(A) = Pr[A(G, [A], [Aw]) = 1]− Pr[A(G, [A], [z]) = 1] ∈ negl(λ),
where the probability is taken over G = (G, q,P) ← Gen(1λ), A ← D`,k,w ←
Zkq , z ← Z`q and the coin tosses of adversary A.
In the case of asymmetric bilinear groups or symmetric k-linear groups, we
similarly say that the D`,k-MDDH Assumption holds relative to AGen2 or MGenk,
respectively. In the former we specify if the assumption holds in the left (A
receives [A]G, [Aw]G or [z]G), or in the right (A receives [A]H , [Aw]H or [z]H).
Definition 4. A matrix distribution D`,k is hard if the corresponding D`,k-
MDDH problem is hard in the generic k-linear group model.
Many different matrix distributions appear in the literature. Namely, the
cascade Ck and symmetric cascade SCk distributions were presented in [11],
while the uniform U`,k, the linear Lk, the randomized linear RLk and the square
polynomial P`,2 distributions were implicitly used in some previous works. We
give their explicit definitions in Appendix B.
3 The Matrix Diffie-Hellman Computational Problems
In this section we introduce two families of search problems naturally related
to the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman problems. In the first family, given a
matrix [A], where A ← D`,k, and the first k components of a vector [z], the
problem is completing it so that z ∈ Im A.
Definition 5 (D`,k-MCDH). Given a matrix distribution D`,k, such that the
upper k × k submatrix of A← D`,k has full rank with overwhelming probability,
the computational matrix Diffie-Hellman Problem is given ([A], [z0]), with A←
D`,k, z0 ← Zkq , compute [z1] ∈ G`−k such that (z0‖z1) ∈ Im A.
The full-rank condition ensures the existence of solutions to the D`,k-MCDH
problem instance. Thus, we tolerate the existence of a negligible fraction of un-
solvable problem instances. Indeed, all known interesting matrix distributions
fulfil this requirement. Notice that CDH and the computational k-Lin problems
are particular examples of MCDH problems. Namely, CDH is exactly L1-MCDH
and the computational k-Lin problem is Lk-MCDH. Indeed, the L1-MCDH prob-
lem is given [1], [a], [z1], compute [z2] such that (z1, z2) is collinear with (1, a),
or equivalently, z2 = z1a, which is solving the CDH problem. All MCDH prob-
lems have a unique solution and they appear naturally in some scenarios using
MDDH problems. For instance, the one-wayness of the encryption scheme in [11]
is equivalent to the corresponding MCDH assumption.
There is an immediate relation between any MCDH problem and its decisional
counterpart. Not surprisingly, for any matrix distribution D`,k, D`,k-MDDH ⇒
D`,k-MCDH.
We are not going to study the possible reductions between MCDH problems,
due to the fact that, essentially, any MCDH problem amounts to computing
some polynomial on the elements of A, and it is then equivalent to CDH ([4, 23]),
although the tightness of the reduction depends on the degree of the polynomial.
In the second family of computational problems, given a matrix [A], where
A ← D`,k, the problem is finding [x] such that x ∈ ker A> \ {0}. It is notable
that some computational problems in the literature are particular cases of this
second family.
Definition 6 (D`,k-KerMDH). Given a matrix distribution D`,k, the Kernel
Diffie-Hellman Problem is given [A], with A ← D`,k, find a nonzero vector
[x] ∈ G` such that x is orthogonal to Im A, that is, x ∈ ker A> \ {0}.
Definition 6 naturally extends to asymmetric bilinear groups. There, given
[A]H , the problem is to find [x]G such that x ∈ ker A> \ {0}. A solution can
be obviously verified by checking if e([x>]G, [A]H) = [0]T . We can also consider
an extension of this problem in which the goal is to solve the same problem but
giving the solution in a different groupGr, in some ideal graded encodingMGm,
for some 0 ≤ r ≤ min(m, k − 1). The case r = 1 corresponds to the previous
problem defined in a m-linear group.
Definition 7 ((r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH). Given a matrix distribution D`,k over a
m-linear group MGm and r an integer 0 ≤ r ≤ min(m, k − 1), the (r,m,D`,k)-
KerMDH Problem is to find [x]r ∈ G`r such that x ∈ ker A> \ {0}.
When the precise degree of multilinearity m is not an issue, we will write
(r,D`,k)-KerMDH instead of (r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH, for any m ≥ r. We excluded
the case r ≥ k because the problem is easy.
Lemma 3. For all integers k ≤ r ≤ m and for all matrix distributions D`,k, the
(r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH Problem is easy.
The kernel problem is also harder than the corresponding decisional problem,
in multilinear groups.
Lemma 4. In a m-linear group, D`,k-MDDH ⇒ (r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH for any
matrix distribution D`,k and for any 0 ≤ r ≤ m − 1. In particular, for m ≥ 2,
D`,k-MDDH ⇒ D`,k-KerMDH.
The proofs of Lemmas 3, and 4 can be found in the full version of this
paper [35].
3.1 The Kernel DH Assumptions in the Multilinear Maps
Candidates
We have shown that for any hard matrix distribution D`,k the D`,k-KerMDH
problem is generically hard in m-linear groups. We emphasize that all our re-
sults refer to generic, ideal multilinear maps (in fact, to graded encodings, which
have more functionality). Our aim is only to give necessary condition for the as-
sumptions to hold in candidate multilinear maps. The status of current candidate
multilinear maps is rather uncertain, e.g. it is described in [28] as “break-and-
repair mode”. Thus, it is hard to argue if our assumptions hold in any concrete
instantiation and we leave this as an open question for further investigation.
3.2 A Unifying View on Computational Matrix Problems
In this section we show how some computational problems in the cryptographic
literature are unified as particular instances of KerMDH problems. Their explicit
definitions are given in Appendix C. It is straightforward to see that Find-Rep [9]
Assumption is just (0,U`,1)-KerMDH, the Simultaneous Double Pairing Assump-
tion (SDP) [2] is RL2-KerMDH, the Simultaneous Triple Pairing [18] Assump-
tion is U2-KerMDH, the Simultaneous Pairing [19] Assumption is P`,2-KerMDH.
The Double Pairing (DP) [18] Assumption corresponds to U1-KerMDH in an
asymmetric bilinear setting. On the other hand, the 1-Flexible Diffie-Hellman
(1-FlexDH) [32] Assumption is C2-KerMDH, the 1-Flexible Square Diffie-Hellman
(1-FlexSDH) [27] Assumption is SC2-KerMDH, and the `-Flexible Diffie-Hellman
(`-FlexDH) [32] Assumption for ` > 1 is the only one which is not in the KerMDH
family. However, `-FlexDH ⇒ C`+1-KerMDH. Getting the last three results re-
quires a bit more work, and they are proven in the full version [35].
4 Reduction and Separation of Kernel Diffie-Hellman
Problems
In this section we prove that the most important matrix distribution families
U`,k, Lk, SCk, Ck and RLk (see Appendix B) define families of KerMDH prob-
lems with strictly increasing hardness, as we precisely state in Theorem 2,
at the end of the section. By ‘strictly increasing’ we mean that (1) there are
known reductions of the smaller problems to the larger problems (in terms of
k) within each family, and (2) there are no black-box reductions in the other
way in the multilinear generic group model. This result shows the necessity of
using D`,k-KerMDH Assumptions for k > 2. A similar result is known for the
corresponding D`,k-MDDH problems. Indeed, one can easily prove a separation
between large and small decisional problems. Observe that any efficient m-linear
map can efficiently solve any D`,k-MDDH problem with k ≤ m−1, and therefore
every two D`,k-MDDH and D˜`,k˜-MDDH problems with k˜ < k are separated by an
oracle computing a k-linear map. However, when dealing with the computational
D`,k-KerMDH family, no such a trivial argument is known to exist. Actually, a
m-linear map does not seem to help to solve any D`,k-KerMDH problem with
k > 1. Furthermore, the m-linear map seems to be useless for any (reasonable)
reduction between KerMDH problems defined over the same group. Indeed, all
group elements involved in the problem instances and their solutions belong to
the base group G, and the result of computing any m-linear map is an element
in Gm, where no efficient map from Gm back to G is supposed to exist.
4.1 Separation
In this section we firstly show the non-existential part of Theorem 2. Namely, we
show that there is no black-box reduction in the generic group model (described
in Section 2.2) from D`,k-KerMDH to D˜`,k˜-KerMDH for k > k˜, assuming that the
two matrix distributions D`,k and D˜`,k˜ are hard (see Definition 4). Before proving
the main result we need some technical lemmas and also a new geometrical notion
defined on a family of subspaces of a vector space, named t-Elusiveness.
In the first lemma we show that the natural (black-box, algebraic) reductions
between KerMDH problems have a very special form. Observe that a black-
box reduction to a flexible problem must work for any adversary solving it. In
particular, the reduction should work for any solution given by this adversary,
or for any probability distribution of the solutions given by it. Informally, the
lemma states that the output of a successful reduction can always be computed
in essentially two ways: (1) By just applying a (randomized) linear map to the
answer given by the adversary in the last call. Therefore, all possibly existing
previous calls to the adversary are just used to prepare the last one. (2) By just
ignoring the last call to the adversary and using only the information gathered
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Fig. 2. Splitting of the black-box reduction.
Let RO be a black-box reduction of D`,k-KerMDH to D˜`,k˜-KerMDH, in the
purely algebraic generic multilinear group model, discussed in Section 2.2, for
some matrix distributions D`,k and D˜`,k˜. Namely, RO solves D`,k-KerMDH with
a non-negligible probability by making Q ≥ 1 queries to an oracle O solving
D˜`,k˜-KerMDH with probability one. As we aim at ruling out the existence of
some reductions, we just consider the best possible case any black-box reduction
must be able to handle. Now we split the reduction as RO = (RO0 ,R1), where
the splitting point is the last oracle call, as shown in Figure 2. We actually use
the same splitting in the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix D. More formally, on
the input of [A], for A← D`,k, and after making Q−1 oracle calls, RO0 stops by
outputting the last query to O, that is a matrix [A˜], where A˜ ∈ D˜`,k˜, together
with some state information s for R1. Next, R1 resumes the execution from s
and the answer [w] ∈ G˜` given by the oracle, and finally outputs [v] ∈ G`.
Without loss of generality, we assume that both stages RO0 and R1 receive the
same random tape, $ (R1 can redo the computations performed by RO0 ).
Lemma 5. There exists an algebraic oracle O (in the sense of Definition 1),
that solves the D`,k-KerMDH Problem with probability one.
All the proofs in Section 4 are given in Appendix D.
Lemma 2 applied to RO0 (and using also Lemma 5) implies that only the
group elements in s can depend on A. Indeed, the non-group elements in s can
only depend on the random tape $. Now, from Lemma 1 applied to R1, we know
that its output [v] is determined by a polynomial map of total degree at most
one in the input group elements (i.e., A˜ and the group elements in s), and the
coefficients of this polynomial can only depend on $, and the non-group elements
in s, which in turn only depend on $. Therefore, splitting the polynomial map
into two parts, for every fixed $ and every fixed oracle behavior in the first Q−1
oracle calls there exists a vector u ∈ Z`q and a linear map η : Z˜`q → Z`q such that
we can write v = u+ η(w), where u actually depends on the group elements in
s. The important fact here is that η can only depend on $, but not on A.
Lemma 6. Let RO = (RO0 ,R1) be a black-box reduction from D`,k-KerMDH to
D˜`,k˜-KerMDH, in the purely algebraic generic multilinear group model, making
Q ≥ 1 calls to an oracle O solving the latter with probability one. If RO succeeds
with a non negligible probability ε then, for every possible behavior of the oracle,
either Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) > negl or Pr(u ∈ S′) > negl , where S′ = ker A> \ {0},
[A] is the input of RO, and its output is written as [u+ η(w)], for some u only
depending on the state output by RO0 , [w] is the answer to the Q-th oracle query,
and η : Zl˜q → Zlq is a (randomized) linear map that only depends on the random
tape of RO.
The following property of the hard matrix distributions allows us to prove
that indeed in the last lemma Pr(η(w) ∈ S \ {0}) ∈ negl .
Definition 8 (t-Elusiveness). A family of subspaces S of a vector space X
over the finite field Zq is called t-elusive for some t < dimX if for all t-
dimensional subspaces F ⊂ X, Pr(F ∩ S 6= {0}) ∈ negl , where the probability
is computed with respect to the choice of S ∈ S. A matrix distribution D`,k is
called t-elusive if the family {ker A>}A∈D`,k is t-elusive.
Lemma 7. If a matrix distribution D`,k is hard (as given in Definition 4) then
D`,k is k-elusive.
In the next theorem we use the k-elusiveness to prove that Pr(u ∈ ker A> \
{0}) > negl for all possible behaviors of the oracle in the first Q− 1 calls. This
actually implies that the reduction can directly output u, and only Q− 1 oracle
calls are actually needed. Therefore, by the descent method we show that no
successful reduction exists unless D`,k-KerMDH is easy.
Theorem 1. Let D`,k be k-elusive. If there exists a black-box reduction in the
purely algebraic generic multilinear group model from D`,k-KerMDH to another
problem D˜`,k˜-KerMDH with k˜ < k, then D`,k-KerMDH is easy.
Now we consider the contrapositive statement, that directly applies to the
known families of hard matrix distributions.
Corollary 1. If a matrix distribution family {D`,k} is hard then for any D`,k
and D˜`,k˜ in the family with k > k˜ there is no black-box reduction in the generic
group model from D`,k-KerMDH to D˜`,k˜-KerMDH.
Proof. Since all D`,k-MDDH problems in the family are generically hard on a k-
linear group, we know that D`,k is k-elusive by Lemma 7, and also D`,k-KerMDH
is hard in that group (otherwise, any solution to D`,k-KerMDH can be used to
solve D`,k-MDDH). By the above theorem, no black-box reduction in the generic
group model from D`,k-KerMDH to D˜`,k˜-KerMDH can exist for k > k˜.
4.2 Increasing Families of KerMDH Problems
Most matrix distributions, like U`,k, Lk, SCk, Ck and RLk, are indeed families
parameterized by their size k. The negative results in Corollary 1 prevent us
from finding reductions from larger to smaller KerMDH problems. Nevertheless,
we provide here some examples of (tight) reductions going in the other way,
within each of the previous families.
Lemma 8. U˜`,k˜-KerMDH⇒ U`,k-KerMDH for any k˜ ≤ k, ˜`> k˜ and ` > k.
Proof. We divide the proof into two steps: Firstly, assume that ˜`= k˜+ 1, k ≥ k˜,
` ≥ k + 1. Given an instance [A˜], with A˜ ← Uk˜+1,k˜, we choose a full-rank
matrix L ∈ Z`×(k+1)q and compute [A] = L([A˜] ⊕ [I]), where I is the identity
matrix of size (k − k˜)× (k − k˜) and ⊕ operation denotes diagonal block matrix
concatenation. That is






Clearly, the probability distribution of the new matrix is statistically close to
the uniform distribution in Z`×kq . Any vector [x], obtained from a solver of
U`,k-KerMDH, such that x ∈ ker A> \ {0} can be transformed into [x˜] such
that x˜ ∈ ker A˜> \ {0} with overwhelming probability,10 by just letting [x˜] to
be the first k˜ + 1 components of L>[x]. Thus, we have built a tight reduction
Uk˜+1,k˜-KerMDH⇒ U`,k-KerMDH.
The second step, k = k˜, ˜`> ` = k˜ + 1, is simpler. Given an instance [A˜],
with A˜← U˜`,k˜, define the matrix [A] to be the upper k˜+ 1 rows of [A˜]. Clearly
A follows the uniform distribution in Z
(k˜+1)×k˜
q . Now, any vector [x] such that
x ∈ ker A> \ {0} can be transformed into [x˜] such that x˜ ∈ ker A˜> \ {0}, by
just padding x with ˜`− k˜− 1 zeros. Thus, U˜`,k˜-KerMDH⇒ Uk˜+1,k˜-KerMDH. By
concatenating the two tight reductions we obtain the general case.
Lemma 9. For Dk = Lk, SCk, Ck and RLk, Dk-KerMDH⇒ Dk+1-KerMDH.
Proof. We start with the case Dk = Lk. Observe that given a matrix A˜ ← Lk,
with parameters a1, . . . , ak, we can build a matrix A following the distribution
Lk+1, by adding an extra row and column to A˜ corresponding to new random
parameter ak+1 ∈ Zq. Moreover, given x = (x1, . . . , xk+2) ∈ ker A> \ {0}, the
vector x˜ = (x1, . . . , xk, xk+2) is in ker A˜
>\{0} (except for a negligible probability
due to the possibility that ak+1 = 0 and x˜ = 0, while x 6= 0). The reduction
consists of choosing a random ak+1, then building [A] from [A˜] as above, and
finally obtaining [x˜] from [x] by deleting the (k + 1)-th coordinate.
Similarly, from a matrix A˜← SCk, with parameter a, we can obtain a matrix
A following SCk+1 by adding a new row and column to A˜. Now given x =
(x1, . . . , xk+2) ∈ ker A>\{0}, it is easy to see that the vector x˜ = (x1, . . . , xk+1)
is always in ker A˜> \ {0}.
Ck-KerMDH ⇒ Ck+1-KerMDH and RLk-KerMDH ⇒ RLk+1-KerMDH are
proven using the same ideas.
By combining Corollary 1 with the explicit reductions given above, we can
now state our main result in this section.
Theorem 2. The matrix distribution families {U`,k}, {Lk}, {SCk}, {Ck} and
{RLk} define families of KerMDH problems with strictly increasing hardness.
Namely, for any D`,k and D˜`,k˜ belonging to one of the previous families, such
that k˜ < k,
1. there exists a tight reduction, D˜`,k˜-KerMDH⇒ D`,k-KerMDH,
2. there is no black-box reduction in the generic group model in the opposite
direction.
5 Applications
We have already mentioned that the Kernel Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
have already found applications in follow-up work, more concretely: a) to gen-
eralize and improve previous constructions of QA-NIZK proofs for linear spaces
10 Actually, x˜ = 0 depends on the (k˜ + 1)-th column of L which is independent of A.
[26], b) to construct more efficient structure preserving signatures starting from
affine algebraic MACS [25], c) to improve and generalize aggregation of Groth-
Sahai proofs [17] or d) to construct a tightly secure QA-NIZK argument for
linear subspaces with unbounded simulation soundness [15].
As a new application, we use our new framework to abstract two construc-
tions of trapdoor commitments. See for instance [3] for the formal definition of
a trapdoor commitment scheme C = (K,Comm,Vrfy,TrapdoorEquiv) and Sec-
tion 6 for a discussion on the advantages of instantiating these commitments
with the new circulant matrix distribution.
5.1 Generalized Pedersen Commments in Multilinear Groups
In a group (G, q,P) where the discrete logarithm is hard, the Pedersen com-
mitment is a statistically hiding and computationally binding commitment to
a scalar. It can be naturally generalized to several scalars. Abe et al. [2] show
how to do similar Pedersen type commitments to vectors of group elements.
With our new assumption family we can write both the Pedersen commitment
and the commitment of [2] as a single construction and generalize it to (ideal)
graded encodings.
– K(1λ, d,m): Let MGm = (e,G1,G2, . . . ,Gm, q,P1, . . . ,Pm)← MGenm(1λ).
Sample A ← Dk+d,k. Let A be the first k rows of A and A the remaining
d rows and T := AA
−1
(w.l.o.g. we can assume A is invertible). Output
ck := (MGm, [A]1), tk := (T).
– Comm(ck, [v]r): To commit to a vector [v]r ∈ Gdr , for any r < m, pick s ←
Zkq , and output [c]r+1 := e([
(
s> || v>)]r, [A]1) = [(s> || v>)A]r+1 ∈ Gkr+1,
and the opening Op = ([s]r).
– Vrfy(ck, [v]r, Op): Given a message [v]r and opening Op = ([s]r), this algo-
rithm outputs 1 if [c]r+1 = e([
(
s> || v>)]r, [A]1).
– TrapdoorEquiv(ck, tk, [c]r+1, [v]r, Op, [v
′]r): On a commitment [c]r+1 ∈ Gkr+1
to message [v]r with opening Op = ([s]r), compute: [s
′]r := [s]r + T>[(v −
v′)]r ∈ Gkr . Output Op′ = ([s′]r) as the opening of [c]r+1 to [v′]r.
The analysis is almost identical to [2]. The correctness of the trapdoor open-
ing is straightforward. The hiding property of the commitment is unconditional,
while the soundness (at level r) is based on the (r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH Assump-
tion. Indeed, given two messages [v]r, [v
′]r with respective openings [s]r, [s′]r, it
obviously follows that [w] := [
(
(s− s′)> || (v − v′)>)]r is a nonzero element in
the kernel (in Gr) of A
>, i.e. e([w>]r, [A]1) = [0]r+1.
Notice that the Pedersen commitment (to multiple elements) is for messages
in G0 and A ← Ud+1,1 and soundness is based on the (0,m,Ud+1,1)-KerMDH.
The construction proposed in [2] is for an asymmetric bilinear group AG2, and in
this case messages are vectors in the groupH and the commitment key consists of
elements in G, i.e. ck = (AG2, [A]G), A← Ud+1,1. Further, a previous version of
the commitment scheme of [2] in symmetric bilinear groups (in [18]) corresponds
to our construction with A← U2+d,2.
5.2 Group-to-Group Commitments
The commitments of the previous section are “shrinking” because they map a
vector of length d in the groupGr to a vector of length k, for some k independent
of and typically smaller than d. Abe et al. [3] noted that in some applications
it is useful to have “group-to-group” commitments, i.e. commitments which are
defined in the same group as the vector message. The motivation for doing so in
the bilinear case is that these commitments are better compatible with Groth-
Sahai proofs.
There is a natural construction of group-to-group commitments which uses
the generalized Pedersen commitment of section 5.1, which is denoted as Ped.C =
(K˜, C˜omm, V˜rfy, ˜TrapdoorEquiv) in the following.
– K(1λ, d,m): Run (c˜k, t˜k)← K˜(1λ,m, d), output ck = c˜k and tk = t˜k.
– Comm(ck, [v]r): To commit to a vector [v]r ∈ Gdr , for any 0 < r < m, pick
[t]r−1 ← [G]kr−1. Let ([c˜]r, O˜p = ([s]r−1)) ← C˜omm(ck, [t]r−1) and output
c := ([t+ v]r, [c˜]r) and the opening Op = ([s]r).
– Vrfy(ck, c, [v]r, Op): On input c = ([y]r, [c˜]r), this algorithm computes [c˜]r+1
and outputs 1 if [t]r := [y − v]r satisfies that 1 ← V˜rfy(ck, [c˜]r+1, [t]r, [s]r),
else it outputs 0.
– TrapdoorEquiv(ck, tk, c, [v]r, Op, [v
′]r): On a commitment c = ([y]r, [c˜]r) with
opening Op = ([s]r), if [t]r := [y − v]r and [t′]r := [y − v′]r, this algorithm
computes [c˜]r+1 and runs the algorithm O˜p ← ˜TrapdoorEquiv(ck, tk, [c˜]r+1,
[t]r, [s]r, [t
′]r), and outputs O˜p.
A commitment is a vector of size k + d and an opening is of size k. The
required security properties follow easily from the properties of the generalized
Pedersen commitment.
Theorem 3. C is a perfectly hiding, computationally binding commitment.
Proof. Since the generalized Pedersen commitment is perfectly hiding, then
([t + v]r, C˜omm(c˜k, [t]r−1)) perfectly hides [v]r because [t]r acts as a one-time
pad. Similarly, it is straightforward to see that the computationally binding prop-
erty of C follows from the computationally binding property of the generalized
Pedersen commitment.
Interestingly, this construction explains the two instantiations of “group-to-
group” commitments given in [3] (see the full version [35] for more details).
6 A New Matrix Distribution and Its Applications
Both of our commitment schemes of Section 5 base security on some Dk+d,k-
KerMDH assumptions, where d is the length of the committed vector. When
d > 1, the only example of Dk+d,k-MDDH Assumption considered in [11] is
the one corresponding to the uniform matrix distribution Uk+d,k, which is the
weakest MDDH Assumption of size (k+ d)× k. Another natural assumption for
d > 1 is the one associated to the matrix distribution resulting from sampling
from an arbitrary hard distribution Dk+1,k (e.g., Lk) and adding d − 1 new
random rows. Following the same ideas in the proof of Lemma 8, it is easy
to see that the resulting Dk+d,k-MDDH assumption is equivalent to the original
Dk+1,k-MDDH assumption. However, for efficiency reasons, we would like to have
a matrix distributions with an even smaller representation size. This motivates
us to introduce a new family of matrix distributions, the CIk,d family.
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∈ Z(k+d)×kq , where ai ← Zq
Matrix A is such that each column can be obtained by rotating one position
the previous column, which explains the name. Notice that when d = 1, CIk,d
is exactly the symmetric cascade distribution SCk, introduced in [11]. It can be
shown that the representation size of CIk,d, which is the number of parameters
d, is the optimal among all hard matrix distributions Dk+d,k defined by linear
polynomials in the parameters. A similar argument shows that the circulant
assumption is also optimal in the sense that it has a minimal number of nonzero
entries among all hard matrix distributions Dk+d,k. It can also be proven that
CIk,d-MDDH holds generically in k-linear groups, which implies the hardness
of the corresponding KerMDH problem. To prove the generic hardness of the
assumption, we turn to a result of Herold [20, Thm. 5.15 and corollaries]. It
states that if all matrices produced by the matrix distribution are full-rank,
CIk,d is a hard matrix distribution. Indeed, an algorithm solving the CIk,d-
MDDH problem in the generic k-linear group model must be able to compute
a polynomial in the ideal H ⊂ Zq[a1, . . . , ad, z1, . . . , zk+d] generated by all the
(k + 1)-minors of A‖z as polynomials in a1, . . . , ad, z1, . . . , zk+d. Although this
ideal can actually be generated using only a few of the minors, we need to build
a Gro¨bner basis of H to reason about the minimum degree a nonzero polynomial
in H can have. We show that, carefully selecting a monomial order, the set of
all (k+ 1)-minors of A‖z form a Gro¨bner basis, and all these minors have total
degree exactly k + 1. Therefore, all nonzero polynomials in H have degree at
least k + 1, and then they cannot be evaluated by any algorithm in the generic
k-linear group model. The full proof of both properties of CIk,d can be found in
the full version [35].
As for other matrix distribution families, we can combine Corollary 1 and the
techniques used in Lemma 9 to show that for any fixed d ≥ 1 the CIk,d-KerMDH
problem family has strictly increasing hardness.
Theorem 4. For any d ≥ 1 and for any k, k˜ such that k˜ < k
1. there exists a tight reduction, CI k˜,d-KerMDH⇒ CIk,d-KerMDH,
2. there is no black-box reduction in the generic group model in the opposite
direction.
The new assumption gives new instantiations of the commitment schemes of
Section 5 with public parameters of size d, independent of k. Further, because
the matrix A ← CIk,d has a many zero entries, the number of exponentiations
computed by the Commit algorithm, and the number of pairings of the verifica-
tion algorithm is kd — as opposed to k(k+ d) for the uniform assumption. This
seems to be optimal — but we do not prove this formally.
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A Deferred Proofs from Section 2.2
Lemma 2. Let AO be an oracle algorithm in the (purely algebraic) generic mul-
tilinear group model, making a constant number of calls Q to an algebraic oracle
O. Let ([x]a, x˜) and ([y]b, y˜) respectively be the input and output of A. Then, for
every choice of x˜ and the random tape, there exist polynomials of constant degree
Y1, . . . , Yβ ∈ Zq[X,R1, . . . ,RQ], such that y = Y (x, r1, . . . , rQ), for all possible
inputs, where Y = (Y1, . . . , Yβ), and r1, . . . , rQ are the parameters introduced in
Definition 1 for the Q queries. Moreover, y˜ does not depend on x or r1, . . . , rQ.
Proof. We proceed by induction in Q. The first step, Q = 0, follows immediately
from Lemma 1, because AO is just an algorithm (without oracle access). For
Q ≥ 1, we split AO into two sections AO0 and A1, separated exactly at the last
query point (see Figure 3). Let ([z]c, z˜) be the state information (group and
non-group elements) that AO0 passes to A1, ([u]d, u˜) be the Q-th query to O,
and ([v]d, v˜) be its corresponding answer. We assume that AO0 and A1 receive
the same random tape, $, (perhaps introducing some redundant computations
in A1). Observe that the output of AO0 consists of ([z]c, z˜) and ([u]c, u˜).
By the induction assumption, for any choice of x˜ and $, there exist some poly-
nomials of constant degree Z1, . . . , Zγ ∈ Zq[X,R1, . . . ,RQ−1] and U1, . . . , Uδ ∈
Zq[X,R1, . . . ,RQ−1] such that z = Z(x, r1, . . . , rQ−1), whereZ = (Z1, . . . , Zγ),
and u = U(x, r1, . . . , rQ−1), where U = (U1, . . . , Uδ), for all possible x ∈ Zαq
and r1, . . . , rQ−1 ∈ Zρq . Moreover, z˜ and u˜ only depend on x˜ and $.
Now, the algorithm A1 receives as input ([z]c, z˜) and ([v]e, v˜). By Defini-
tion 1, v also depend polynomially on u and rQ. Namely, for every choice of
u˜, there exist polynomials of constant degree V1, . . . , V ∈ Zq[U ,RQ] such that












Fig. 3. Splitting of the oracle algorithm in Lemma 2.
Since A1 is just an algorithm without oracle access, by Lemma 1, for any
choice of v˜, z˜ and $, there exist polynomials of constant degree Y1, . . . , Yβ ∈
Zq[V ,Z] such that y = Y (v, z), where Y = (Y1, . . . , Yβ), for all v ∈ Zq and
z ∈ Zγq , while y˜ only depends on v˜, z˜ and $. By composition of all the previous
polynomials, we show that y depend polynomially on x and r1, . . . , rQ, where
the polynomials depend only on $ and x˜. Indeed
y = Y (V (U(x, r1, . . . , rQ−1), rQ),Z(x, r1, . . . , rQ−1))
and all the polynomials involved depend only on x˜, z˜, u˜, v˜ and $, but all in turn
only depend on x˜ and $. In addition, for the same reason, y˜ only can depend on
x˜ and $, which concludes the proof.
B Examples of Matrix Distributions
Some particular families of matrix distributions were presented in [11]. Namely,
SCk : A =
a 01 . . .. . . a
0 1
 Ck : A =
a1 01 . . .. . . ak
0 1
 Lk : A =
a1 0. . .0 ak
1 · · · 1
 ,
where a, ai ← Zp, and U`,k which is simply the uniform distribution in Z`×kp .
The SCk-MDDH Assumption is the Symmetric Cascade Assumption, the Ck-
MDDH Assumption is the Cascade Assumption, which were proposed for the
first time. U`,k-MDDH is the Uniform Assumption, which appeared under other
names in [7, 37]. Lk-MDDH is the Decisional Linear Assumption [6, 22, 40]. For
instance, we can consider the case k = 2, in which the L2-MDDH problem is given
([1], [a1], [a2]), tell apart the two distributions ([1], [a1], [a2], [w1a1], [w2a2], [w1 +
w2]) and ([1], [a1], [a2], [z1], [z2], [z3]), where a1, a2, w1, w2, z1, z2, z3 are random.
This is exactly the 2-Lin Problem, since we can always set z1 = w1a1 and
z2 = w2a2. We also give examples of matrix distributions which did not appear
in [11] but that are implicitly used in the problems 2 and 4 in Appendix C. The
Randomized Linear and the Square Polynomial distributions are respectively
given by the matrices





b1 · · · bk














where ai ← Zq and bi ← Z×q . Jutla and Roy [24] referred to RLk-MDDH As-
sumption as the k-lifted Assumption.
C Flexible Problems That Fit into the New Framework
In this section we recall some computational problems in the cryptographic liter-
ature that we unify as particular instances of KerMDH problems. These problems
are listed below, as they appear in the cited references. In the following, all pa-
rameters ai and bi are assumed to be randomly chosen in Zq.
1. Find-Rep [9]: Given ([a1], . . . , [a`]), find a nonzero tuple (x1, . . . , x`) such
that x1a1 + . . .+ a`x` = 0.
2. Simultaneous Double Pairing (SDP) [2]: Given the two tuples, ([a1], [b1]) and
([a2], [b2]), find a nonzero tuple ([x1], [x2], [x3]) such that x1b1 + x2a1 = 0,
x1b2 + x3a2 = 0.
3. Simultaneous Triple Pairing [18]: Given the two tuples, ([a1], [a2], [a3]) and
([b1], [b2], [b3]), find a nonzero tuple ([x1], [x2], [x3]) such that x1a1 + x2a2 +
x3a3 = 0, x1b1 + x2b2 + x3b3 = 0.




2], . . . , [a
2
` ]),
find a nonzero tuple ([x1], . . . , [x`]) such that
∑`





5. 1-Flexible Diffie-Hellman (1-FlexDH) [32]: Given ([1], [a], [b]), find a triple
([r], [ra], [rab]) with r 6= 0.
6. 1-Flexible Square Diffie-Hellman (1-FlexSDH) [27]: Given ([1], [a]), find a
triple ([r], [ra], [ra2]) with r 6= 0.
7. `-Flexible Diffie-Hellman (`-FlexDH) [32]: Given ([1], [a], [b]), find a (2` +




i=1 ri)ab]) such that
rj 6= 0 for all j = 1, . . . , `.
8. Double Pairing (DP) [18]: In an asymmetric group (G,H,T), given a pair
of random elements ([a1]H , [a2]H) ∈ H2, find a nonzero tuple ([x1]G, [x2]G)
such that [x1a1 + x2a2]T = [0]T .
D Deferred Proofs from Section 4
Lemma 5. There exists an algebraic oracle O (in the sense of Definition 1),
that solves the D`,k-KerMDH Problem with probability one.
Proof. Observe that D`,k only uses group elements both in the instance descrip-
tion and in the solution to the problem. In addition, the problem (input/output
relation) can be described by a polynomial map. Indeed, one can use the k-minors
of A, which are just polynomials of degree k, to obtain a basis of ker A>. Then
the oracle can use parameters r1, . . . , r`−k as the coefficients of an arbitrary
linear combination of the basis vectors. Sampling these parameters uniformly
results in an oracle answer uniformly distributed in ker A>.
Lemma 6. Let RO = (RO0 ,R1) be a black-box reduction from D`,k-KerMDH to
D˜`,k˜-KerMDH, in the purely algebraic generic multilinear group model, making
Q ≥ 1 calls to an oracle O solving the latter with probability one. If RO succeeds
with a non negligible probability ε then, for every possible behavior of the oracle,
either Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) > negl or Pr(u ∈ S′) > negl , where S′ = ker A> \ {0},
[A] is the input of RO, and its output is written as [u+ η(w)], for some u only
depending on the state output by RO0 , [w] is the answer to the Q-th oracle query,
and η : Zl˜q → Zlq is a (randomized) linear map that only depends on the random
tape of RO.
Proof. Let us denote S = ker A>, where [A] is the input toRO, and S′ = S\{0}.
Analogously, S˜ = ker A˜>, where [A˜] is the Q-th oracle query, and S˜′ = S˜ \ {0}.
From the discussion preceding the lemma, we know that u and η are well-defined
and fulfil the required properties. In particular, η depends only on the random
tape, $, of RO. As a black-box reduction, RO is successful means that it is
successful for every possible behavior of the oracle in its Q queries, with a success
probability at least ε. We arbitrarily fix its behavior in the first Q − 1 queries.
Concerning the last one, for all w ∈ S˜′, Pr(u + η(w) ∈ S′) > ε, where the
probability is computed with respect to $ and the randomness of [A]. Now,
defining
pw = Pr(u ∈ S ∧ u+ η(w) ∈ S′)
rw = Pr(u /∈ S ∧ u+ η(w) ∈ S′)
we have pw+rw > ε. But not all rw can be non-negligible since the corresponding
events are disjoint. Indeed, for any vector w 6= 0 and any different α1, α2 ∈ Z×q ,
u+ η(α1w) ∈ S, u+ η(α2w) ∈ S ⇒ (α2 − α1)u ∈ S ⇒ u ∈ S
and then
∑
α∈Z×q rαw ≤ 1. Thus, there exists αm such that rαmw ≤ 1q−1 , which
implies pαmw > ε− 1q−1 . Now, we split pαmw, depending on whether u ∈ S′ or
u = 0,
pαmw = Pr(u = 0 ∧ η(w) ∈ S′) + Pr(u ∈ S′ ∧ u+ η(αmw) ∈ S′) ≤
≤ Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) + Pr(u ∈ S′)
and conclude that either Pr(u ∈ S′) > negl or for all nonzero w ∈ S˜′, Pr(η(w) ∈
S′) > negl . However, which one is true could depend on the particular behavior
of the oracle in the first Q− 1 calls.
The next lemma is needed in other subsequent proofs.
Lemma 10. Consider integers l = k + d, l˜ = k˜ + d˜ such that k, d, k˜, d˜ > 0 and
k > k˜. Let η : Zl˜q → Zlq be a linear map. Then, there exists a subspace F of Im η
of dimension at most k such that for all d˜-dimensional subspaces S˜ of Zl˜q, either
S˜ ⊂ ker η or dimF ∩ η(S˜) ≥ 1.
Proof. If rank η ≤ k it suffices to take F = Im η. Indeed, if S˜ 6⊂ ker η, i.e.,
η(S˜) 6= {0}, then dimF ∩ η(S˜) = dim η(S˜) ≥ 1. Otherwise, rank η > k, let F a
subspace of Im η of dimension k, using the Grassman’s formula,
dimF ∩ η(S˜) = dimF + dim η(S˜)− dim(F + η(S˜)) ≥ k + dim η(S˜)− rank η ≥
≥ k + dim S˜ − dim ker η − rank η = k + d˜− l˜ = k − k˜ ≥ 1
Lemma 7. If a matrix distribution D`,k is hard (as given in Definition 4) then
D`,k is k-elusive.
Proof. By definition, given a non-k-elusive matrix distribution D`,k, there exists
a k-dimensional vector subspace F ⊂ Z`q such that PrA←D`,k(F ∩ ker A> 6=
{0}) = ε > negl . F can be efficiently computed from the description of D`,k
with standard tools from linear algebra.
Let M ∈ Zk×`q be a maximal rank matrix such that Im M> = F . Then,
dim(F∩ker A>) = dim(Im M>∩ker A>) ≤ dim ker(A>M>) = dim ker(MA)> =
dim ker(MA), as MA is a k × k square matrix. Thus, we know that
Pr
A←D`,k
(rank(MA) < k) ≥ ε
Now we show how to solve the D`,k-MDDH problem with advantage almost ε on
some k-linear groupG, by means of a k-linear map. Let [(A‖z)] be an instance of
the D`,k-MDDH problem. In a ‘real’ instance z = Ax for a uniformly distributed
vector x ∈ Zkq , while in a ‘random’ instance, z is uniformly distributed Z`q. A
distinguisher can efficiently compute [MA] and [Mz]. Observe that in a ‘real’
instance rank(MA‖Mz) = rank(MA‖MAx) = rank(MA), while in a ‘random’
instance Mz is uniformly distributed in Zkq . Therefore, for a ‘random’ instance
there is a non-negligible probability, greater than ε− 1q , that rank(MA) < k and
rank(MA‖Mz) = rank(MA) + 1, because Mz ∈ Im(MA) occurs only with a
negligible probability < 1q . Then, the distinguisher can efficiently tell apart the
two cases because with a k-linear map at hand computing the rank of a k × k
or a k × k + 1 matrix can be done efficiently.
Theorem 1. Let D`,k be k-elusive. If there exists a black-box reduction in the
purely algebraic generic multilinear group model from D`,k-KerMDH to another
problem D˜`,k˜-KerMDH with k˜ < k, then D`,k-KerMDH is easy.
Proof. Let us assume the existence of the claimed reduction, RO = (RO0 ,R1),
making Q ≥ 1 oracle queries, where Q is minimal, and with a success probability
ε. Then, by Lemma 6, its output can be written as [u+η(w)], where η : Zl˜q → Zlq
is a (randomized) linear map that does not depend on the particular choice of the
matrix A in the D`,k-KerMDH input instance, but only on the random tape of
the reduction. Let us denote as above S = ker A>, and S′ = S\{0}. Analogously,
S˜ = ker A˜>, where A˜← D˜`,k˜ and S˜′ = S˜ \ {0}.
We now prove that in Lemma 6, for any possible behavior of the oracle in
the first Q − 1 calls, there exists a particular behavior in the last call such
that Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) is negligible. Namely, the Q-th query is answered by O by
choosing a uniformly distributed w ∈ S˜′ (as required to be algebraic, according
to Definition 1). Indeed, Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) = Pr(η(w) ∈ S) − Pr(η(w) = 0). Now,
developing the second term,
Pr(η(w) = 0) = Pr(η(w) = 0 | S˜ ⊂ ker η) Pr(S˜ ⊂ ker η) +
+ Pr(η(w) = 0 | S˜ 6⊂ ker η) Pr(S˜ 6⊂ ker η) =
= Pr(S˜ ⊂ ker η) + Pr(w ∈ S˜ ∩ ker η | S˜ 6⊂ ker η) Pr(S˜ 6⊂ ker η) =
= Pr(S˜ ⊂ ker η) + negl
where the last equality uses that the probability that a vector uniformly dis-
tributed in S˜′ belongs to a proper subspace of S˜′ is negligible. Analogously,
Pr(η(w) ∈ S) = Pr(η(w) ∈ S | η(S˜) ⊂ S) Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S) +
+ Pr(η(w) ∈ S | η(S˜) 6⊂ S) Pr(η(S˜) 6⊂ S) =
= Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S) + Pr(w ∈ S˜ ∩ η−1(S) | η(S˜) 6⊂ S) Pr(η(S˜) 6⊂ S) =
= Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S) + negl
Thus, Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) = Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S) − Pr(S˜ ⊂ ker η) + negl . Now, using
Lemma 10, we know that there exists a subspace F of dimension at most k such
that if S˜ 6⊂ ker η, then dimF ∩ η(S˜) ≥ 1. Therefore Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S) − Pr(S˜ ⊂
ker η) ≤ Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S ∧ dimF ∩ η(S˜) ≥ 1) ≤ Pr(dimF ∩ S ≥ 1). Due to the
k-elusiveness of D`,k, from Lemma 7, the last probability is negligible. Namely,
it is upper bounded by AdvD`,k-MDDH +
1
q , where AdvD`,k-MDDH denotes the
advantage of a distinguisher for the D`,k-MDDH problem. By Lemma 6,
Pr(u ∈ S \ {0}) > ε− 1




for any possible behavior of the oracle in the first Q − 1 calls. Therefore, we
can modify the reduction R to output u, without making the Q-th oracle call.
The modified reduction is also successful, essentially with the same probability ε,
with only Q−1 oracle calls, which contradicts the assumption that Q is minimal.
In summary, if the claimed reduction exists then there also exists an algorithm
(a “reduction with Q = 0”) directly solving D`,k-KerMDH without the help of
any oracle and with the same success probability.
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